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H. Odera Oruka’s philosophy, as can be discerned from his various works, revolves around the 
issue of social justice. In this paper I seek to shw how Oruka’s idea of social justice is 
inextricably bound up with his conceptions of human rights and humanism,  and his contention 
that one of the fundamental principles of social justice is the recognition and realization of the 
human minimum as the most basic universal human right. 
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Introduction 
H. Odera Oruka’s philosophy, as can be discerned from his various works, revolves around the 
issue of social justice. He had a passion for the establishment of socio-economic structures that 
would guarantee that all human beings live in dignity, and are thus able to be part of the 
community of moral agents. In this paper I seek to sh w how Oruka’s idea of social justice is 
inextricably bound up with his conceptions of human rights and humanism,  and his contention 
that one of the fundamental principles of social justice is the recognition and realization of the 
human minimum as the most basic universal human right. 
 
The paper sets out with an examination of Oruka’s conception of freedom and liberty, after 
which it focuses on his assessment of the state of fr edom in Africa, his evaluation of freedom at 
the global level, and his contention for the need of a clear conceptualization of the human 
minimum. 
 
Oruka’s Conception of Freedom and Liberty 
Oruka's view of liberty is well articulated in his book, The Philosophy of Liberty (1991/1996). In 
that work, he sets out by presenting a brief survey of the historical understanding of liberty from 
classical Greece to modern Europe. He observes that the most common conception of freedom 
among the thinkers of these two historical periods made a distinction between mental and social 
freedom. Mental freedom emerges from that literature as a state that pertains to an individual’s 
unconstrained exercise of intellectual activities either as a rational pursuit of truth or as an 
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exercise of one’s will, and is considered to be prima y to social freedom. But Oruka does not 
agree with this view. He sees the two as necessarily related such that they cannot be separated in 
the practical world. He argues that because one must exi t before one can think, social liberty 
cannot be secondary to mental freedom. What is more, since social liberty is viewed primarily as 
the enjoyment of civil or political rights, it is the condition under which the exercise of mental 
freedom becomes possible. Moreover, thinking is hardly about anything other than things that 
pertain to life (Oruka 1996, 9-10). Thus to emphasize mental freedom at the expense of social 
freedom amounts to emphasis on the individual at the expense of society, a mode of thinking 
which Oruka does not agree with. He also points out that placing emphasis on mental freedom 
seems to ignore the fact that freedom is considered a fundamental right in virtue of its role as a 
possession by which one makes demands on others. Without this social role freedom would lose 
its thrust as a value (Oruka 1996, 59-60, 81).
 
Oruka further contends that like other values considered as rights, liberty is relational. As such, 
it cannot logically be sought outside the social context, nor can it be sought for its own sake, but 
to fulfill ends whose necessity or goodness are easily encumbered or endangered by actions of 
other people (Oruka 1996, 51). Consequently, he givs a stipulative definition that takes into 
account those aspects of liberty that he deems to be lacking in both classical Greek and later 
European conceptions. He proposes that an adequate definition of liberty should be expressed 
thus: “liberty for X in S”, where X may represent any individual and S represents some 
particular society or community (Oruka 1996, 50-52). Therefore he writes, “‘liberty for X in S’ 
means that ‘X has, with respect to S and with equality with others in S, ability and opportunity 
to obtain or satisfy X’s primary and secondary needs in S’” (Oruka 1996, 52). 
 
In the light of this definition, one would not have liberty if one had some needs but lacked either 
the ability or opportunity to fulfill those needs, or if the needs are not fulfillable at all on 
grounds that lack of opportunity to fulfill them is the result of either direct or indirect actions of 
others that make meeting one’s needs impossible (Oruka 1996, 55-57). One is directly prevented 
from fulfilling one’s needs if another person acts in a manner that is explicitly intended to 
prevent one’s needs from being fulfilled, for instance, if there is some law that prohibits certain 
persons from admission into certain schools, hospitals or restaurants. But one may also be 
indirectly prevented from fulfilling one’s needs if, or instance, one is subjected to some 
condition in which one is unable to financially afford to meet the needs. Therefore, poverty is an 
indirect hindrance to the meeting of such important needs as education and healthcare. This is 
why it does not make much sense to defend the idea of freedom in such cases by arguing that a 
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poor person is free to access such services when he or she is not in a condition that would make 
having such services a matter of election on his or her part. 
 
Human needs can be either primary or secondary (Oruka 1996, 60-63). Primary needs are those 
requirements that make human life possible: without them the kind of life that is understood to 
be specifically human would not be possible. We can assume, for example, that having 
livelihood at the biological level is essential for the sustenance of any life at all. But having 
humans foraging from landfills or dumpsters for survival is not exactly what anyone expects of 
humans as their regular mode of living, as this does not distinguish such practice from what, say, 
beasts do in the wild. The difference between humans and wild beasts, then, must be sought in 
the mode of procuring the materials that the body needs for its survival, that is, in the 
organization of such procurement that might include not only the regularity, but also the quality 
of the procurement to meet the standards required for the good of the specifically human life. 
 
However, the modes of meeting the needs that pertain to specifically human life are not limited 
to the procurement of food, although this is fundamental. We know, for example, that human 
life is built around the acquisition and use of organized knowledge. Like food, acquisition and 
use of organized knowledge guarantees human survival in an incremental scale commensurate 
with the changing complexity of threats to human survival from both nature and other humans. 
Creation and delivery of knowledge in an organized manner in incremental levels commensurate 
with human ability to comprehend and successfully apply such acquired knowledge is therefore 
a primary human need and right. In addition, we can s y, reasonably, that the need for food and 
education is in service of the guarantee that we are secure from threats to our lives that would 
result from not being able to feed ourselves, and not being able to have the knowledge for 
countering threats from our surroundings (Oruka 1996, 60-62). It follows that there must be 
something greater than the specific provisions per se. It is our need once we are alive that we 
continue to meet these needs, in the very least, at the levels minimally required for a properly 
human life. Security or protection from threats is therefore also a primary human need (Oruka 
1997, 85; Shue 1980, 20-22). 
 
Finally, on this list, one must address the question of how the meeting of these needs becomes a 
reality for every human person whose natural interests they define. It would be an oxymoron to 
argue that the needs are primary to human life unless humans possessed the freedom to acquire 
or realize them. 
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Primary needs are fundamental and universal and, on that basis, are rights. This means that there 
cannot possibly be any other needs that override them. Secondary needs, on the other hand, are 
those requirements that enrich life. Although life would still be possible without them, such life 
would probably be only of low quality (Oruka 1996, 51). In Oruka’s view, primary needs are 
physical security, food, shelter, clothing, knowledg , freedom (of action and movement), health, 
and sex. Sex gets onto the list as a biological necessity for the survival of human community, 
but can be viewed as a primary need only if it is granted that humans cannot survive as 
individuals without community. Secondary needs are some specific requirements that are 
contingent upon the primary needs, such as, for example, the freedom to express oneself, to 
assemble with others, to have an opinion, to be religious or areligious, to have culture, and to 
have sex for pleasure (Oruka 1996, 60-63). 
 
The classification of human needs into primary and secondary is very important in two 
significant ways. First, the fulfillment of primary needs is a priority for all human beings and 
human societies, and, secondly, when there is confli t between the fulfillment of the primary 
and secondary needs, the fulfillment of primary needs must take precedence over that of 
secondary needs. Thus for Oruka, liberty can be primary or secondary depending on the needs 
for which it is sought. This idea also entails the fact that liberty, or lack of it, is a matter of 
degree depending on the extent to which one’s needs are fulfilled. Oruka outlines and explains 
the freedoms that correspond to such needs. These ar  conomic freedom, political freedom, 
intellectual freedom, cultural freedom, religious freedom, and sexual freedom (Oruka 1996, 64-
83), each of which comprises subordinate freedoms for very specific ends. Of them all, 
economic freedom is the most basic because, as Oruka explains, it is a complex freedom 
comprising, among other things, the freedom relating o the fulfillment of most of the basic 
human needs such as freedom from hunger, freedom to find shelter, freedom from disease and 
ill health, freedom to find work and earn income, and freedom to use one’s earning as one 
wishes. 
 
Political freedom comprises other freedoms some of which relate to the fulfillment of basic 
needs, such as freedom of action (that is, the freedom to act according to one’s conscience) and 
freedom to have education (or, freedom from ignorance). Due to its broadness, political freedom 
enables the fulfillment of several other subordinate freedoms which are entailed by our 
membership in communities, such as the freedom to have an opinion (also called freedom of 
thought), freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom to get the right information, 
freedom to seek power, freedom to vote, and freedom to form or belong to a political party. And 
since most of these freedoms relate to the fulfillment of secondary needs, political freedom can 
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be considered a secondary freedom. Most of the constituents of political freedom define or 
articulate our civil rights. But it is also secondary to economic freedom because its effective 
enjoyment is a function of economic freedom. The human need for the freedom to engage in 
economic activities for the provision of livelihood is what leads to the need to have the 
appropriate regulatory arrangements that guarantee and protect such pursuits for all, thus making 
economic and political freedoms to be complementary. But because it is more basic, economic 
dependency is always likely to threaten and, as history has shown, often compromise political 
freedoms. Across the globe, economic dependency is a major hindrance to the effective 
enjoyment of political freedom (Oruka 1996, 67-71). 
 
Cultural freedom means the ability and opportunity to elect to live according to one’s own 
preferences perceived as the best ways to reasonably live their lives, whether in accordance with 
or differently from the ways prescribed by one’s culture, while still fulfilling both primary and 
secondary human needs. It involves seeking what one may consider a satisfying, gratifying, or 
happy life. And being a secondary freedom, its value lies primarily in the enrichment of human 
life for the practitioner, and cannot therefore rationally involve seeking a decadent or worse 
mode of life, or life which is in total disregard of other people’s feelings and cultural choices. As 
such, this is freedom to meet such needs as what it is or they are that one can enjoy privately as 
fulfilling to one without interference or pressure from others whose similar or comparable 
freedoms such choices do not directly affect. And since the practice of culture takes place in 
communal settings, it presupposes political freedom and demands political protection (Oruka 
1996, 79-80). 
 
Intellectual freedom, which refers to the unconstrained ability to seek and practice one’s 
knowledge or express one’s thought, comprises other related freedoms such as the freedom to 
read and write, the freedom to conduct experiments a d research, and the freedom to practice 
critique as an inherent part of participating in the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge. 
These freedoms have been curtailed in a variety of ways by oppressive ideological governments 
and movements. Across the globe, the emergence of totalitarianism in the post-WW I years led 
to the prescription of content of knowledge by selectiv ly banning learning resources and 
herding humans into repetitive and uncreative cognitive torture. Thus, both conceptually and 
historically, this complex freedom implies and springs from political freedom (Oruka 1996, 71-
74, 80). 
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Religious freedom means the unconstrained ability of individuals and groups to live according 
to their own choice of religious faith driven by a belief in a supernatural being or beings; or to 
live without any such belief at all as their own rational determination or cultural allegiance may 
lead them. Since most religions claim to guide their adherents towards a good life, religious 
freedom entails the pursuit of the good life as may be directed by one’s religious belief. This 
necessarily means that religious freedom presupposes several of the freedoms already discussed 
above, as religious belief and practice involves freedom of thought, political freedom that 
provides the conducive political atmosphere for having and practicing the beliefs that one’s 
choice of religion prescribes and, finally, cultural freedom from discrimination by those whose 
beliefs one may choose not to share (Oruka 1996, 76-77). 
 
Relatively less widespread and sometimes more controversial than the aforementioned freedoms 
is sexual freedom, or the unconstrained ability, at the right age as determined by law and reason, 
to engage in sex either as a means of perpetuating nd preserving the human species, or for 
pleasure. As a drive that comes directly from biological make-up, the ability to satisfy one’s 
sexual desire in a manner not biologically harmful to oneself or to the person with whom one 
chooses to have the union, sexual freedom is a primary freedom regardless of whether those 
who engage in it want to procreate or to have pleasure. Although it is separate from others by 
virtue of its specificity, it is entangled with other freedoms, especially cultural and religious 
freedoms. Given the controversy it bears in our time, it is also dependent upon political freedom 
as a civil right. This means that effective enjoyment of sexual freedom would not be possible 
where cultural freedom is lacking or severely suppressed (Oruka 1996, 78-80). 
 
Oruka argues that of all the freedoms listed above, economic freedom is the most fundamental. 
In his view, one needs economic freedom (Fe) in order to enjoy political freedom (Fp), which in 
turn provides the general umbrella protection for the enjoyment of cultural freedom (Fc). The 
three freedoms are related and collectively contain the other three freedoms, namely intellectual 
freedom (Fi), religious freedom (Fr), and sexual freedom (Fs): 
… Fe is the most fundamental liberty and it remains a necessary condition for Fp 
which in turn becomes a condition for Fc and Fc in turn is necessary for the three 
liberties, Fi, Fr and Fs. These three liberties are independent of one another. One 
does not, for example, need sexual freedom in order to exercise intellectual 
freedom and vice versa. Similarly, no intellectual or sexual freedom is necessary 
for those seeking religious freedom; religious monks and nuns are, for example, 
often freer and happier living in exclusion from circles that encourage intellectual 
or sexual tastes (Oruka 1996, 80). 
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Thus the issue of freedom is a central theme in Oruka’s philosophical reflections. He did not 
believe that making a distinction between mental freedom and social freedom was of much help. 
For him, mental freedom is only an aspect of social freedom, because it can never be exercised 
independently of certain social conditions that make its execution possible. Such social 
conditions necessarily affect intellectual practice, and vice versa. In other words, freedom is 
never sought for its own sake but for ends other than itself such as to fulfill certain human needs. 
One is free only to the extent to which the needs for which freedom is sought are fulfilled. But 
given that human needs are either basic or secondary, so is freedom basic or secondary.  
Freedoms sought to fulfill basic needs are basic freedoms, while freedoms sought to fulfill 
secondary needs are secondary freedoms. Oruka therefore conceives freedom as necessarily 
social, that is, relational. Its enjoyment entails rights and obligations (Oruka 1996, 9-10, 59-63, 
88). 
 
The State of Freedom in Africa 
Although the above list and description of freedoms have a tinge of a critique of the colonial 
universe to them, Oruka’s preoccupation with freedom was probably even more motivated by 
what he regarded as the deplorable state of freedom in postcolonial Africa. It was his view that 
there was not much use of talking about freedom unless people - ordinary citizens - were 
conscious of being free. Awareness of one’s freedoms r rights is pivotal, because doing must 
always begin with one’s self awareness as an agent, that is, an unconstrained actor. Secondly, 
this consciousness must entail one’s awareness of several things: of the conceptual and practical 
needs for which freedom is sought; of the prioritization of these needs; of those factors that 
hinder freedom; and, finally, of the need to remove them: 
To be conscious of freedom is to be conceptually and practically aware of those 
elements, physical and social, that deny one freedom. It is to be conscious of the 
need to remove such elements as a necessity for the ealisation of freedom. 
Hence, to be fully conscious of freedom is to be cons ious of all those factors 
that hinder freedom (Oruka 1996, 87). 
  
One will then not be sufficiently conscious of freedom when one mixes up 
primary and secondary freedoms: when one opts for asecondary freedom instead 
of opting for a primary freedom. On the basis of this confusion one demands, say, 
a television set instead of a sanitation gadget, a car instead of a house, the 
opportunity to excel in the culture of a “master race” instead of the indigenous 
ability to remove the social-cultural base that perpetuates racism, one demands 
the removal of a colonial governor while leaving untouched the removal of the 
colonial medal decoration - one demands political independence but leaves out 
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economic or cultural independence. One is inspired by now half truth 
Nkrumahian maxim, ‘seek ye first political kingdom and all else will be added 
unto thee’ (Oruka 1996, 88). 
   
The fundamental question raised in the passages above is whether African nationalists who led 
the struggle against colonialism were sufficiently conscious of the implications of the freedom 
for which they struggled. It seemed to Oruka that most of them had not developed an adequate 
consciousness of freedom, namely, that the political and cultural freedoms that they so loudly 
advocated entailed the other freedoms as listed and described above, or that the political and 
cultural freedoms would themselves not be viable or sensible enough without an effective 
economic freedom. Without economic freedom, pioneer African leaders had not won any real 
freedom to bring home or to be proud of, thus largely leaving African peoples as illustrations of 
the old adage that “you are what you eat”. African countries are yet to realize that failure to 
control their economic resources is one single obstacle to having genuine freedom and 
independence (Oruka 1996, 87-89; 1997, 106-107). 
 
Political freedom cannot be an end in itself. As important as it may be, it is merely a gate to 
other freedoms which describe practical self-determination in the lives of the citizens of a 
nation, including their freedom to put in place a political order and leadership of their 
preference. It is obvious that Oruka drafted the notes for these views in the period of great 
political upheaval in Africa, probably in the years in which the last of the draconian African 
rulers were trying their best to cling to power by ruthlessly suppressing citizens’ freedoms and 
violating human rights with impunity. In his own country, Kenya, academicians had become a 
politically endangered species in the last decade of Daniel arap Moi’s dictatorship, academic 
innovativeness had been dealt a death blow, and choice of academic profession was increasingly 
equatable with a suicidal tendency. As discontent with Moi’s dictatorship grew, his (Moi’s) 
removal was widely viewed as Kenya’s second liberation, and the view that there was need for 
the removal of similar regimes in Africa spread through the continent. In the light of these 
developments, especially where the suppression of academic freedom symbolized the highest 
political achievement of the dictators, Oruka’s reflections were inevitably directed at reassessing 
whether political freedom from colonial control had meant anything to anyone in the new 
nations. Oruka himself puts it thus: 
There is no doubt that many of the people involved in the liberation struggles see 
the end of those struggles simply as a matter of driving away the colonial or 
racist administration and taking over the offices vacated by the colonial regime. 
When they take over they expect to run the countries in the same style as the 
former colonial regime except, however, where they expect that the benefits will 
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be to themselves and to the fellow Africans. If these types of people are 
persuaded that national liberation is something more than the mere removal of a 
colonial regime, they must need to know the end of a national liberation - they 
must need to know and practice the ideology on the basis of which their post-
colonial nation will be organised…. Otherwise the peo le will, when the colonial 
regime is removed, find themselves unable to know what to do with the 
“liberated” country.  They will also find that, they have no need and reason to 
unite. The consequences are neo-colonialism, tribalism, sectionalism, corruption, 
inefficiency and power struggles (Oruka 1996, 109). 
 
Pervasive neo-colonialism, tribalism, corruption and persistent internal conflicts and wars are 
real hindrances to the enjoyment of greater freedom in Africa. Without seriously addressing the 
issue of freedom, Oruka argued, real social development would most likely continue to elude 
African people. Oruka explains: “This ‘complete lack of idealism’ on the part of leaders makes 
them have little concern for their state and its fuure and they become poor representatives of the 
masses. They are representatives of the people but not for the people” (Oruka 1996, 102). An 
ideology is very important in showing people the social values and ideals by and for which they 
should live. Yet, at independence, many African state  lacked explicit ideological frameworks to 
guide their politics. Leaders who advocated and practiced the so-called African socialism were 
often incoherent or inconsistent (Oruka 1996, 101-12). 
 
To undercut Africans’ yearning for freedom, colonial regimes in Africa propagated the myth 
that colonialism did not underdevelop Africa through exploitation, but that Africa was already 
long underdeveloped before colonialism arrived, which is why, in their view, it fell easily and 
quickly to colonialism. On the contrary, therefore, they would argue, colonialism was meant to 
develop Africa (Oruka 1996, 89). The resulting ideology of domination based on the practice of 
Africans’ economic dependency further led, as well explicated by the leading scholars of the 
new analytical–critical framework of political economy, to the polarization between the 
countries of the north and the so-called “underdeveloped countries”. The misleading impression 
one gets from these economic theorizations of history is that the colonial countries were already 
fully developed themselves and needed no more development, while the so-called 
“underdeveloped” countries were the ones that needed development at the behest of those 
already developed. As a result, the colonial countries were purportedly benefactors rather than 
exploiters. Yet, as Oruka explains, no country is ever fully developed such that it needs no 
further improvements in the lives of its people or in the kind of knowledge from which these 
improvements accrue. On the contrary, the so-called “d veloped” countries have continued to 
depend on their former colonies for material supplies to their industries as well as for the local 
knowledge that accompany the preparation of these mat rials (Oruka 1997, 108-113). 
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Oruka further explains that development cannot be equated with material well-being to the 
exclusion of other forms of freedom. Rather, a country is fully developed if and only if all the 
freedoms are fully enjoyed by every citizen: “If N is a nation, the concept ‘N is developed’ 
means that in N the people have their economic and socio-cultural needs fully satisfied, i.e., that 
in N one has all the social freedoms such as economic, political, cultural, intellectual, religious 
and sexual freedoms”(Oruka 1997, 95). But  “If N is a nation, the concept ‘N is underdeveloped’ 
means that in N the people have their economic and socio-cultural needs inadequately satisfied, 
i.e., that in N, the people do not sufficiently have all the social freedoms such as economic, 
political, cultural, intellectual, religious and sexual freedoms” (Oruka 1997, 113). Thus 
according to Oruka’s conception of development, no country is or can be fully developed, as 
development is a complex and ever continuing process. 
 
Oruka explains that due to lack of economic freedom, the postcolonial condition remains one 
that is defined by a relationship of persistent patronage. Instead of acting free, African countries 
have continued to look up to their former colonial masters for advice and direction, a condition 
that greatly undermines any chance of autonomy and self-determination (Oruka 1996, 96-99). In 
Oruka’s words, “African nationalists and leaders were thus made to see the necessity of adapting 
all their needs to those of the metropolitan centres. Their economies, cultures, political 
constitutions, etc. were allowed to be the satellites of the metropolitan centres” (Oruka 1996, 
97). Thus it was Oruka’s view that even after political independence Africa continues to suffer 
pervasive abject poverty and persistent civil conflicts with their attendant untold suffering and 
unnecessary loss of human life. This raises the issue of the very meaning of freedom and 
independence, and the extent to which such values are currently enjoyed in Africa. 
 
According to Oruka, there are in the current African political experience two ways in 
which the philosophical truth that “the independent” is free meets its antithesis. One is 
the now widespread realisation that most of the African republics (though regarded as 
independent states) are, with respect to the former colonial powers, sovereign but not 
free. The other is that the post-independence awareness, among many African peoples, 
that for them independence has not eradicated the economic and cultural servitude 
brought by the colonialists; and they further observe that even the colonial political 
servitude which independence did destroy had been rplaced by another form of political 
servitude (Oruka 1996, 99-100). 
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Oruka thought that the need for attention to the human good was more acute in Africa where, 
due to rampant human rights abuses, most countries deserved to be called African Republics of 
Inhumanity and Death (ARID): 
The value of human life in ARID is below the minimu demanded by humanity, 
and intolerable to any normal human conscience. Life is hard and godless; it is 
“brutish, nasty and short.” Thus ARID is completely arid when the question of 
humanism is raised. There is no single humanist ideal in it. And worse still, there 
is no philosophy or ideology coming to it either from within or without that 
would help liberate the people. Frantz Fanon saw this a long time ago - the great 
danger to Africa is the absence of ideology (Oruka 1997, 143). 
 
A look at Africa today confirms that the situation represented by the acronym invented by 
Oruka, ARID, continues to characterize life in many African countries. Many people are still 
being maimed, killed or turned into refugees within or across the borders of their countries by 
interstate or intrastate wars, while many others are rendered destitute by famine and preventable 
diseases. In some cases, these problems are the direct result of actions by governments or arise 
from government-sponsored violence on their own people, while in others they have resulted 
from the apathy of people in government. It is morally unacceptable that some individuals and 
institutions should be allowed to cause death and suffering, either directly or indirectly by 
deliberately declining to prevent the causal conditions of the plight of the very people they are 
supposed to protect and lead. 
 
The State of Freedom: A Global Perspective 
According to Oruka, lack of true freedom is not an African peculiarity. Because poverty remains 
a crucial cause of loss of true freedom, the spread of poverty across the globe carries unfreedom 
with it, making poor people everywhere the subjects of manipulation by the nations on whose 
finances their economies depend. Despite the different degrees of dependency, much of the so-
called global South, where most of the world’s poor live, suffers from inadequacy of freedom, 
or limited freedom, if you wish. And of them all, Africans have the least amount of freedom 
despite supplying the highest percentage of the natural resources and raw materials that drive the 
economies of the rich nations. In his article, “Achievements of Philosophy and One Current 
Practical Necessity for Mankind” (1987/1988), Oruka h d argued that the enjoyment of the 
basic freedoms, as we outlined earlier in this paper (Oruka 1996), is one of the practical 
necessities of human life. This article appears as ch pter 9 in his book, Practical Philosophy: In 
Search of an Ethical Minimum (1997) under a slightly different title. There he writes: 
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In human life there are certain needs whose fulfilment is a condition for the 
survival of the human species and for any meaningful creative action. Such needs 
have basic socio-eco-biotic characteristics. And they are what I wish to refer to 
here as the practical necessities of human life. In actual life they have to do with 
the necessities for (i) biological/physical human survival, (ii) freedom from 
abject ignorance and (iii) a certain minimum of dignity for persons and races. 
The fulfilment of such necessities is a priority that precedes all thought and all 
philosophy (Oruka 1997, 99). 
 
The necessity to have these needs met cannot be subj ct to any debate, and denying them to 
anyone or any group would amount to threatening their very survival (Oruka 1997, 100-102). 
Therefore, he argued, eradication of world poverty (abject or absolute poverty) is the obligation 
of all capable human beings, and hence a concern of humanity as a whole. He believed that 
philosophers had a special moral mission to articulate this basic duty of all to each other and to 
the human race. To complete its mission, philosophy has to extend its functions to the ethics of 
human life and the conditions for the improvement of the world for human existence. This 
concern calls for philosophers to help reorganise and rationalise the available knowledge in 
order to improve human understanding and the welfare of mankind. And here lies the moral 
mission of philosophy. In our times it is more urgent than the concern, say, to develop new 
methods for solving classical metaphysical paradoxes (Oruka 1997, 99). 
 
It is the search for such principles that Oruka partly attempts in the article “Parental Earth 
Ethics”, which later appears as book chapters (Oruka 1996, 111-121; Oruka 1997, 146-151). 
The article was first published in 1993 in the Journal Quest (Vol. VII, No. 1 June) as a response 
to an article by Garrett Hardin, “Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor” (Sterba 
1997, 78-8). In arguing against the rich helping the poor, Oruka countered, Hardin fails to 
explain the dependency of the richer countries of the global North on the so-called “poor 
countries” of the South for the sources of their wealth. The amassing of wealth by the North has 
not been a unilateral venture, and the deliberate obscuring of the contributions of the South leads 
to the false impression that the North owes nothing to those countries from which they have 
sucked the resources on which Northern economies depen . The issue is, therefore in Oruka’s 
view, not just one of recognition, but indeed of fair distribution of the end products.  Oruka aptly 
points out this shortcoming in Hardin’s argument among others. 
 
 In “Parental Earth Ethics”, Oruka observes that the living conditions of most African 
populations, and the populations of the global South, are not only in deplorable states, but are 
also likely to worsen. Most of the people in these regions live below the poverty line that 
inhibits them from living at the level of minimum requirements commensurate with human 
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dignity as per the definition of freedom outlined above. To rectify these anomalies, Oruka 
proposes an ethical principle for distributing world resources that would guarantee the 
enjoyment of the fundamental human rights as a minimum requirement of universal justice. He 
referred to this principle as the ethics of the right to a human minimum. This is the right to 
which every human being is entitled because it defines those conditions upon which human life 
separates from the lives of brutes: it gives everyone the basis for demanding the fulfillment of 
those needs upon which this difference depends. In this sense, the principle goes beyond merely 
requiring the recognition and respect for the fundamental rights of other human beings. The 
right to a human minimum refers to those needs that a human being must fulfill to live as a 
person, that is, with the basic freedoms we described earlier as entitlements (Oruka 1997, 83-88, 
146-150). 
 
The Human Minimum  
Most theorists of rights agree that demanding the iems under specific rights is rationally 
defensible. For example, according to Henry Shue, “A right provides a basis for a justified 
demand. If a person has a particular right, the demand that the enjoyment of the substance of the 
right be socially guaranteed is justified by good reasons, and the guarantees ought, therefore, to 
be provided” (Shue 1980, 13). 
 
Human rights are moral rights, thus they may not be enforceable by law. Their appeal is 
however not weakened by that fact. They acquire their appeal from the prevailing moral 
principles and beliefs, and are promoted as the basis and goal of social and political orders. 
Thus, according to some philosophers, Oruka included, they are neither the function of nor the 
basis for benevolence or charity (Edwards 1967, 198; Shue 1980, 14; Oruka 1997, 89). They are 
tied to an understanding of the basic requirements of a specifically human life that must attend 
to its dignity (Kucuradi 1982, 47-48). Therefore, a violation of a human right is a threat either to 
human survival or dignity. To have a right is to have an adequate justification why the substance 
of the right ought to be granted (Shue 1980, 13). Edwards writes: 
 
A man with a right has no reason to be grateful to the benefactors; he has ground 
for grievance when it is denied. The concept presupposes a standard below which 
it is intolerable that a human being should fall –not just in the way that cruelty to 
an animal is not to be tolerated but, rather, that human deprivations affront some 
ideal conception of what a human life ought to be lik , a conception of human 
excellence. It is on the face of it unjust that some en enjoy luxuries while others 
are short of necessities, and to call some interest luxuries and others necessities is 
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implicitly to place them in an order of priorities as claims. Upsetting that order 
then demands to be justified (Edwards 1967, 199). 
 
It is Edwards’ view that except under justifiable circumstances, the pursuit of basic human needs 
ought to take precedence over that of secondary ones that are merely sources of enrichment. 
This ought to be the case at both the individual and societal levels, because basic rights define 
the lower limit of a decent human life. Oruka calls this limit the human minimum (Oruka 1997, 
87), while Shue calls it the moral minimum. This minimum, in Shue’s words, “concerns the 
least that every person can demand and the least that every person, every government, and every 
corporation must be made to do” (Shue 1980, p.ix). To have a right is to have or enjoy the 
substance of the right (Oruka 1997, 86). But when it is not within one’s ability to provide for the 
substance of a right, one is justified to demand that some other person or persons make some 
arrangements so that one will still be able to enjoy the substance of the right (Shue 1980, 16). 
 
As earlier noted, basic human needs include physical ecurity and subsistence (Shue 1980, 20-
24). Physical security includes such needs as protecti n from harm or threats of it in any form, 
including subjection to death, mayhem, rape or assault. Subsistence includes needs for adequate 
food, adequate shelter, adequate clothing, unpolluted air, unpolluted water, basic healthcare, 
freedom of movement, and access to knowledge (Oruka 1996, 60-61; Sterba 1991, 113). It was 
Oruka’s view that everyone needs these goods as a sine qua non for human survival (Oruka 
1996, 62-63). Basic needs are therefore those requirements that must be satisfied in order not to 
seriously endanger one’s health and sanity (Sterba 1991, 108). They form the necessary content 
of the right to life, in agreement with Sterba’s view that one’s right to life “would most plausibly 
be interpreted as a right to receive those goods an resources that are necessary for satisfying 
her basic needs” (Sterba 1991, 108). The right to life is therefore analytically equivalent to what 
Oruka calls the right to a human minimum (Oruka 1997, 87-88). Being basic, this right is 
absolute, and therefore an inherent necessity for the enjoyment of other rights. According to 
Shue (1980, 26-27), the enjoyment of any other right presupposes this right to life. This also 
means that the right to life, or the human minimum, cannot be limited (restricted), compromised 
or overridden by any other consideration, nor by the enjoyment of any other right (Oruka 1997, 
88; Savci 1982, 61). 
 
Any attempt to limit, compromise or override one’s right to life to a level below the human 
minimum becomes a threat to one’s health or sanity, and therefore a threat to one’s natural 
rights, namely, the rights that are inextricable from what it means to be human. If this happened, 
one would be unable to exercise one’s reason and cou t oneself as a moral agent (human 
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person). In such a situation, one would be forced to act on one’s instinct. Such a person is not 
reasonably and morally expected to respect any right of any other person (Shue 1980, 29-30). 
But even if such a person wanted to respect the rights of other people, that is, to behave morally, 
he or she would not be able to do so because his or her only preoccupation would be his or her 
own survival. 
 
Thus according to Oruka, the right to a human minimum is the basis for a justified demand by 
anybody that the world (not just his society) has the duty to guarantee that he is not denied the 
chance to live a life of minimum good health; and should he or she find himself or herself in a 
situation where this right is denied, he or she is likely to be tempted to disregard his or her own 
moral obligations toward others, and society as a whole will have no adequate moral ground for 
expecting him or her to respect anybody else’s right to anything, including those rights that are 
protected by the principles of territorial sovereignty and national supererogation (Oruka 1997, 
88). Being universal, the right to a human minimum i poses obligations that transcend 
territorial, national, racial, or religious boundaries (Oruka 1997, 87). As Shue aptly put it, “Basic 
rights, …, are everyone’s minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity. They are the 
rational basis for justified demands the denial of which no self-respecting person can reasonably 
be expected to accept” (Shue 1980, 19). The right to a human minimum is therefore a universal 
right possessed by every person as a human being (Sterba 1991, 108). 
 
We can reinforce the rationale for the universal obligation to promote the human minimum by 
appealing to Singer’s moral argument for assisting the absolutely poor. In so doing, we would be 
assuming that living in absolute or abject poverty is analytically equivalent to living a human 
life that is below the human minimum, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Singer’s 
argument runs as follows: If one can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of 
greater or equal comparable moral significance then one ought to do it. Absolute poverty is a 
bad thing. And there is some absolute poverty that one can prevent without sacrificing anything 
of greater or equal comparable moral significance. Therefore, such a person ought to prevent 
some absolute poverty. Singer argues that when the ric  people allow the poor to suffer and die 
when they themselves can prevent such suffering and death, they actually engage in reckless 
homicide for which they are morally blameable (Singer 1997, 90-91). 
 
Humanism and the Right to a Human Minimum 
Given the moral nature of human rights, Oruka thougt that philosophers had the primary duty 
to concern themselves with their promotion, especially to define and explain them as the 
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ultimate goal of any social and political order. Heb lieved that moral approaches to solving 
current problems in the world are superior, and would be far more effective than military 
options. All scholars, but philosophers especially, ought to take it as their duty to help in the 
search for the moral solutions to world problems - the most urgent of which he identified as 
abject poverty and conflict, particularly the prospects of a nuclear war. Philosophers, he 
believed, can help in the search for permanent solutions to the threats to humanity that emanate 
from these problems by giving both descriptive and prescriptive attention to the content of 
human good. In other words, moral good, not military might, will guarantee security for 
mankind (Oruka 1997, 132-133). 
 
The right to a human minimum is therefore the benchmark for humanism. In “Philosophy and 
humanism in Africa”, a paper first published in 1978, and reprinted as a chapter in his book, 
Practical Philosophy: In Search of an Ethical Minimu  (1997), Oruka defines humanism as the 
positive quality, security and well-being of human existence as either individual or collective 
life (Oruka 1997,139). He thought of humanism as an ideal which is attainable through, yet 
greater than, the sum of the contents of a human minimum. It is the ultimate end toward which 
the endeavors defined in the human minimum should aim. Oruka argued that humanism is the 
ultimate moral good that is served by the attainment of the subservient goods like happiness, 
freedom, duty, power, perfection, self-realization, k owledge, and faith in God:  
Take for example, the standard of happiness. Happiness is not real unless it is a 
result or a symbol of the good and true quality and security of one’s life. 
Happiness derived for instance, from stolen goods or a sweet poison cannot be 
real happiness. Like happiness, freedom is not real–it is meaningless and 
dangerous– if it is not in line with the quality and security of one’s life. Freedom 
of destitute, slave or madman cannot be real freedom. Likewise, the possession of 
power is futile and undesirable unless it guarantees h  security of he who has it 
and those on behalf of whom it is possessed and exercised … (Oruka 1997, 139-
140). 
 
Although “Philosophy and Humanism in Africa” was written in 1978, the ideas articulated 
therein, such as collective responsibility for the promotion of the human good in Africa and the 
world in general, have only recently moved to the center of philosophical reflections worldwide. 
The solution to the rampant lack of social justice is to make respect for human rights as defined 
in the idea of the human minimum a globally enforceabl  objective of all governments, 
organizations, and individuals. All governments of the world, and all organizations and 
individuals of good moral reason should recognize, respect, and act at all times to promote for 
all the right to a human minimum as an absolute and u iversal right. Ensuring its universal 
enjoyment should be an obligation of all governments, organizations, or individual persons who 
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have the means, and its beneficiaries should be everyon  regardless of national, ideological, 
racial or religious affiliations. 
 
It should be pointed out that Oruka’s discontent with ethnophilosophy, a dominant feature of 
philosophical practice by African scholars during the first few decades of political 
independence, was due to his belief that the movement was not capable of rising to the 
challenges of the new realities in Africa. He therefo  frequently talked with disappointment 
about the lack in Africa of philosophical thought and practice that could help liberate its people 
from the prevailing political acts of inhumanity. By contrast, he believed, a critical tradition of 
philosophy would help by first analyzing the present, deplorable conditions of human existence 
in Africa, and then prescribing the minimum moral good that ought to be met by all African 
governments and states as a condition of their legitimacy (Oruka 1997, 138-140, 144). What is 
more, Oruka’s inception of the “Sage philosophy movement” and his insistence that the ordinary 
person had important critical ideas worthy of philosophical consideration by professional 
philosophers was meant first and foremost to erase the academics’ imaginary and self-imposed 
bifurcation of human experience in which they think that they tread a world removed from that 
of the people with whom they share the same politica , economic, linguistic, and other important 
cultural factors that promote thought (see Oruka 1991). 
 
In addition, Oruka proposed the formation of an organization for the promotion of humanism in 
Africa (OPHA) by African and Afro-Asian philosophers (Oruka 1997, 144). He considered the 
need to address the poor state of humanism in Africa to be so urgent that the formation of 
OPHA to promote critical philosophy necessary for its initiation and nurturing could not wait 
only for long-term solutions (Oruka 1997, 144). OPHA would have the function, among others, 
of promoting critical philosophical thinking and evaluation of the social and moral order in the 
various African states. It would also define the mini um moral good below which no state 
could go without meeting with continental and global condemnation and excommunication 
(Oruka 1997, 144). 
 
Furthermore, Oruka proposed the formation of a world government - the government of 
humanity - to check on the conditions that not only threaten human survival but also limit 
human freedom (Oruka 1997, 126-133), akin to what Louis P. Pojman later called for (Pojman 
2006, chapter 2). Such a world government ought to ave the mandate and ability to oversee and 
enforce the right to a human minimum, even if doing so requires that it overrides the sovereignty 
of some nations (Oruka 1997, 133; Pojman 2006, 56-57). 
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Obstacles to the Enjoyment of the Right to a Human Minimum  
Among the obstacles on the path to universal human happiness is the mismanagement of world 
resources. Experts tend to agree that there is morethan enough wealth in the world to support 
every human being currently existing to live above th human minimum. For example, in the 
1990s a number of scholars asserted that the world pro uces sufficient goods and other 
resources to meet the cost of satisfying the human inimum of every existing person in their 
respective societies (see for examples Sterba 1991, 114-115; Singer 1997, 86-87). According to 
Sterba, “it has been projected that if all the arable lands were optimally utilized a population of 
between 38 and 48 billion people could be supported” (Sterba 1991, 115). On his part, Singer 
observed that “The world does produce enough food. Moreover the poor nations themselves 
could produce far more if they made use of improved agricultural techniques” (Singer 1997, 87). 
In Singer’s view, the fundamental problem is with the distribution of wealth. There is need, he 
observed, to transfer some wealth from the rich (affluent) nations and individuals to the poor 
ones (Singer 1997, 87). If this were to happen, there would also be need to transfer improved 
technologies to the poor nations to enable them to op imally utilize their resources. 
 
 According to Oruka, however, there are at least two major obstacles to the worldwide 
distribution of wealth and enjoyment of the right to a human minimum that need urgent attention 
and international cooperation. They are: 
(i) The principle and current practice of international justice. 
(ii)  Ignorance of the nature of the basic rights and the corresponding universal obligations 
(Oruka 1997, 83-85). 
 
Oruka explains that the principle of national supererogation states that a people having territorial 
sovereignty have a right over its resources and may do whatever it wishes with its possessions. 
As a corollary of the principle of territorial sovereignty, this principle exonerates a state from 
any moral blame if “it remains indifferent to the neds of those outside its borders, however 
needy and starving such people may be” (Oruka 1997, 82).  If a state decides to help those 
outside its borders, it will be understood, on the basis of this principle, that such an act is purely 
an act of charity and it has absolute right to set th  conditions of the help and to demand praise 
for such help. 
 
It is therefore evident that the current practice of international justice is inconsistent with the 
demands of the right to a human minimum that imposes obligation on all people who are 
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capable, regardless of their race or country, to ensure the enjoyment of the right for those unable 
to ensure it for themselves. It seems, therefore, that here is need to formulate an adequate 
ethical rationale and blueprint for the just distribution of global resources among earth’s 
inhabitants, and by which the demands of global justice may override those of international 
justice in case the two are in conflict (Oruka 1997, 83-90, 130-132, 147-150). 
 
The other obstacle to humanism is ignorance of the nature of human rights as occupying a place 
of priority above all other interests. An understanding of the nature of basic rights would lead to 
an appreciation of their universal corresponding obligations. Such appreciation would cause 
people to become aware of their duties to humanity as a whole. The presence of this obstacle 
also explains the persistence of certain barriers, especially those serving political purposes, such 
as the failure of some governments to give priority to the allocation of their resources to the 
provision of basic human needs, or their unwillingness to intervene where other, errant 
governments blatantly violate the fundamental rights of their citizens, which inhibit the 
realization of the right to a human minimum and humanism in the world. Criticism of the failure 
of European and American governments to intervene to prevent the now infamous genocidal 
outbreak in Rwanda until it was far too late to prevent the death of more than eight hundred 
thousand people is a case in point. Similar failures in Central Europe and in the Darfur Region 
of Sudan have also been recorded as grave moral and political shortcomings that have led to 
unnecessary loss of human lives. 
 
Oruka observed that people need to be educated on the dangers of fear, greed and irrational 
pride (Oruka 1997, 133-134) as the breeders of antago ism and conflict in the world. He argued 
that fear is perhaps the leading cause of wars based on perceived differences of class, tribe, race, 
and gender. For him, class ideology, tribalism, racism, and sexism are not only impediments to 
human freedom, but also the cause of much of human suffering and loss of life in our time, and 
their origin is traceable to lack of sound moral education. 
 
Furthermore, Oruka pointed out that greed, as distinct from ambition, is also a threat to human 
freedom and survival. Greed motivates one to amass po essions regardless of, and at the 
expense of, other people’s well-being. Any person who bears this character trait hardly 
appreciates the moral imperative to help those in need. If it is not checked, or if it is allowed to 
pass as ambition, greed becomes a definite obstacle to the discharge of responsibility towards 
the realization of the right to a human minimum. Onthis account, greed is evidently unjust 
(Oruka 1997, 134). 
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Irrational pride, in Oruka’s view, is also a vice. It prevents people from developing moral 
empathy and therefore blinds them from recognizing duty toward other people. Oruka believed 
that it is irrational pride that sustains misuse of p wer of any kind and the quest for dominance 
of one nation over another, as happened in the case of Europe’s colonial conquest of most of the 
rest of the world and her subsequent ideological, economic and military domination thereof 
(Oruka 1997, 134). 
 
Conclusion 
In both life and profession, Oruka was a champion of th se who were marginalized from what 
contemporary academic opinion deemed to be worthy of theoretical consideration. His 
humanism is therefore not limited to the claim that we should all take suffering seriously, but 
also includes the realisation that there must be something wrong with our sense of honesty if on 
the one hand we want to recognize our indebtedness to each other for all those matters that 
define us as members of a community while, at the same time, also claiming that it is a just 
society which leaves everyone to his or her own fate because each one has only himself or 
herself, or its own people in the case of a state, as the primary objects of their social and moral 
responsibility. Oruka in fact believed, as I have tri d to show, that it is the latter attitude that is 
to blame for contemporary global conflicts. His positi n can therefore be viewed as a warning to 
the world that the dictatorship of the elite, whether by education, political position, wealth, and 
other assumed positions of privilege over the margin lized and suffering majority, cannot 
sustain world peace for long. As such, “promoting peace by fighting poverty” can no longer be a 
mere slogan. Building community by taking care of each other must be the surer way ( Oruka 
1997, 100-101). Moreover, Oruka believed that democracy is one of the means for overcoming 
conflict and other threats to human survival and freedom. He saw the enhancement of 
democracy as part of the moral duty of all toward the promotion of the human good in the 
context of the human minimum: 
Perhaps by the turn of the century there will be a new rebirth of the global 
democratic spirit. It is now a moral duty for philosophers and the scholars of 
humanity the world over to study the state of the world and suggest how a new 
and sustaining global democratic spirit can be born (Oruka 1997, 136). 
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